Child’s Right of Action for Prenatal Injuries by Clark, Walter M.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1951 Issue 3 
January 1951 
Child’s Right of Action for Prenatal Injuries 
Walter M. Clark 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Walter M. Clark, Child’s Right of Action for Prenatal Injuries, 1951 WASH. U. L. Q. 408 (1951). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss3/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
408 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
NOTES
CHILD'S RIGHT OF ACTION FOR PRENATAL INJURIES
I. INTRODUCTION
An important question has arisen as to whether a child en
ventre sa mere is deemed a legal person in the law of torts, or
stated differently, whether a person has a cause of action for
injuries allegedly incurred when he was in his mother's womb.
In many respects a child en ventre sa mere is considered in
point of law as in esse, i.e., a legal person, from the moment
of conception. Thus the unborn child is deemed to be living at the
time of the death of the testator for purpose of taking by
devise, and the fee vests in the unborn infant as devisee, sub-ject to being divested if the child is not born alive.1 Further-
more, if a child born alive dies by reason of injuries feloniously
inflicted upon it before birth, the offense is murder. 2 A fair
generalization seems to be that ". . . a legal personality is im-
puted to an unborn child'. . . for all purposes beneficial to the
infant after his birth,.., but not for purposes working to his
detriment." ' While it is well settled that the unborn child is
considered a legal person in the fields of property and criminal
law, he has not usually been granted such a status in the law
of torts.
II. GENERAL DENIAL OF RECOVERY
Although a few recent decisions hold otherwise, the weight of
authority is that a child does not have a cause of action for his
prenatal injuries. Several reasons have been advanced by the
courts. A. Unborn Child Merely A Part of the
Mother; Not a Person In Esse.
One of the principal reasons offered by the courts which deny
recovery for prenatal injuries is that the child en ventre sa
mere is not a person at all, but merely a part of the mother. In
Mays v. WeingartenW plaintiff's mother, then in her sixth month
1. Valley National Bank v. Hartford Accident &. Indem. Co., 57 Ariz,
276, 113 P.2d 359 (1941); Tomlin v. Laws, 301 Ill. 616, 134 N.E. 24 (1922).2. Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1898).
3. Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
4. 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio App. 1943).
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
of pregnancy, was riding on a bus which was struck by defen-
dant's automobile. Plaintiff alleged that defendant's negligent
operation of the car and the resulting accident caused his (plain-
tiff's) premature birth and subsequent illness. The order sustain-
ing defendant's demurrer was affirmed on appeal. Plaintiff
argued that since a "person" has a cause of action for personal
injuries negligently inflicted, plaintiff's petition had stated facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The Ohio Court of
Appeals answered:
The manifest difficulty with this argument is that even
though he had plead he was a person when injured in the
mother's womb, he had no separate existence of his own.
When born he became a person. [Italics added].5
And in Ryan v. Public Service Co-ordinated Transport,6 where
plaintiff brought suit by next friend for prenatal injuries negli-
gently inflicted, the New Jersey Supreme Court, refusing to
admit the independent existence of the plaintiff while en ventre
sa mere, stated:
May this court attach an unnatural meaning to simple words
and hold independently of statute that a cause of action for
prenatal injuries is reserved to the child until the moment
of its birth and then accrues? The formulation of such a
principle of legal liability against precedent and practice
may be a tempting task, to which sympathy and naturaljustice point the way; but I cannot bring myself to the con-
clusion that plaintiff had a cause of action at common law.
The injuries were, when inflicted, injuries to the mother.
[Italics added] .
This proposition, that from the moment of conception to the
moment of birth the unborn child is merely a part of its
mother, and not a separate and independent being, is universally
supported by those courts refusing a cause of action to the child
for prenatal injuries s
5. Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N.E.2d 421, 422 (Ohio App. 1943). A later
Ohio Supreme Court opinion, Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.,
152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1948) seems to overrule this case.
6. 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14 A.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
7. Ryan v. Public Service Co-ordinated Transport, 18 N.J. Misc. 429,
4:24, 14 A.2d 52, 55 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
8. Stanford v. St. Louis-San-Francisco R, Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566
(1926); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900);
Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939); Bliss v.
Passanesi, 95 N.E.2d 206 (Mass. 1950); Dietrich v. Northhampton, 138
Mass. 14 (1884); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704 (1901).
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B. No Duty Is Owed To the Unborn Child
Once a court holds that an unborn child is not a person in
esse, the court deduces that the unborn child is owed no duty
by a defendant who negligently injures the child's mother. In
Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights Ry. Co.," plaintiff's mother was
negligently injured by defendant's agent while a passenger on
defendant's carrier. When the accident occurred plaintiff was
a foetus of eight months. Plaintiff was born thirty-six days
later with injuries allegedly caused by said accident. Refusing
plaintiff a cause of action, a New York Appellate Court declared:
Negligence is culpable failure to observe a duty owed by one
to another in a particular relation, and a remedy is allowedfor injury therefrom. What duty did the defendant as a
carrier owe the unborn child? The child in its distinct
entity was not a passenger, and the company owed it as
a separate person no duty in the matter of safe carriage.'0
C. Impossibility of Proof of Causal Relation
A number of courts refusing recovery for prenatal injuries
have said that it is virtually impossible to show with any degree
of certainty a causal connection between the plaintiff's particular
injury or deformity and the accident complained of. Admittedly
it is easy to see that it would be difficult to show that a deformity
in a child was proximately caused by an injury to his mother
which occurred two, or three, or four months before his (the
child's) birth. Being mindful of this medicolegal difficulty, the
courts have put much weight on the proposition that any expert
medical testimony might well be based on conjecture rather
than informed opinion; and coupling this argument with others
against allowing recovery, the courts refuse to let the case
go to the jury. Such a case is Magnolia CocaCol Bottling Co.
V. Jordan." There plaintiff, who was struck by defendant's
truck, alleged that as a result of this accident she was pre-
maturely delivered of twins, one of which died, and for whose
wrongful death she sued. Denying recovery, the Texas Supreme
Court discussed the difficulty of showing the causal connection
between the accident and the subsequent death of the child, and
concluded:
9. 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y. Supp. 367 (2d Dep't. 1913).10. Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 154 App. Div. 667, 672, 137 N.Y.
Supp. 367, 371 (2d Dep't. 1913).
11. 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
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.. it is easy to see on what a boundless sea of speculation
in evidence this new idea [allowing a cause of action for
prenatal injuries] would launch us. What a field would
be opened to extravagance of testimony, already great
enough, if science could carry her lamp, not over certain in
its light where people have their eyes, into the unseen labor-
atory of nature-could profess to reveal the causes and
things that are hidden there.
12
The same line of reasoning was employed in Smith v. Luck-
hardt.1 3 There plaintiff's mother employed defendant, a physi-
cian. The defendant incorrectly diagnosed her pregnancy as a
tumor of the womb. The treatment the defendant prescribed
and administered consisted primarily in X-ray treatments of the
abdominal cavity. Plaintiff was born several months later.
The tissues of her body were scarred, and she was feeble-minded.
At age thirteen she brought suit (by next friend) against de-
fendant." At that time her mental faculties had not progressed
beyond those of a normal two year old child. Plaintiff alleged
that defendant's incorrect diagnosis of her mother's condition
was negligence, and that this negligent act resulted in the ad-
ministration of the X-ray treatments, which was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's maladies. When the case reached an Illinois
appellate court, plaintiff was denied recovery. The court re-
stated the other arguments voiced against allowing a cause of ac-
tion for prenatal injuries, and also emphasized the belief that:
... the cause of physical or mental defects that appear at
childbirth or thereafter may be congenital, or due to [other]
injuries prior or subsequent to the accident.'5
A number of other courts have adopted this argument, i.e., that
a causal relation between a negligently caused injury to the
mother and an injury to the unborn foetus cannot be estab-
lished.
12. Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 353, 78
S.W.2d 944, 946 (1935).
13. 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939).
14. Plaintiff was not barred by the statute of limitations, since it does
not begin to run until plaintiff has reached his majority.
15. Smith v. Luckhardt, 229 Ill. App. 100, 108, 19 N.E.2d 446, 450 (1939).
16. Bliss v. Passanesi, 95 N.E.2d 206 (Mass. 1950); Durivage v. Tufts,
94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847 (1947); Ryan v. Public Service Co-ordinated
Transport, 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14 A.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Krantz v.
Cleveland, Akron, Canton Bus Co., 32 Ohio N.P.(N.S.) 445 (1933);
Lewis v. Steves Sash & Dor Co., 177 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943);
Walker v. Great Northern R. Co., L.R. 28 C.L. 69 (Ireland 1891).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss3/7
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D. Other Reasons: Probability of Fictitious Claims;
Lack of Precedent; Mother Can Recover for Injuries
Not Too Remote; Courts' Refusal to Legislate
The principal reasons offered by courts denying recovery for
prenatal injuries are discussed above. There are, in addition to
those, other arguments offered, not as forcibly, but worthy of
note here. First, it is said that if the courts open the door to
recovery for prenatal injuries, numerous plaintiffs will come
forth demanding compensation for alleged prenatal injuries or
deformities, probably the result of any number of causes other
than an accident involving plaintiff's mother and defendant.I
Second, a number of courts are unwilling to overrule the cases
formerly denying recovery under similar circumstances; the
respect for precedent effects reluctance to establish new causes
of action.' 8 Third, in addition to other reasons for denying
recovery, the courts say that the child's mother can recover
for any damage to the child if such damage is not too remote
for recovery at all.' 9 Finally, many courts have said that, since
constitutions and statutes giving "persons" a cause of action
for wrongful injuries did not intend an unborn child to be
considered a "person," the legislature, not the court, must
create the cause of action for prenatal injuries, if any is to be
created.20
In general, then, the majority of the decisions involving suits
for prenatal injuries deny the plaintiff a cause of action. The
various courts use varying combinations of the reasons discussed
above.
III. TREND TOWARDS PERMITTING RECOVERY
In spite of the majority holding to the contrary, a few courts
have recently decided that a child has a cause of action for
prenatal injuries negligently inflicted. The opinions in these
17. Bliss v. Passanesi, 92 N.E.2d 206 (Mass. 1950); Krantz v. Cleveland,
Akron, Canton Bus Co., 32 Ohio N.P.(N.S.) 445 (1933).
18. Bliss v. Passanesi, 92 N.E.2d 206 (Mass. 1950); Ryan v. Public
Service Co-ordinated Transport, 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14 A.2d 52 (Sup. Ct.
1940); Krantz v. Cleveland, Akron, Canton Bus Co., 32 Ohio N.P.(N.S.)
445 (1933).
19. Stanford v. St. Louis-San-Francisco R. Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So.
566 (1926) ; Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
20. Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937) ; Buel
v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1923).
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cases endeavor primarily to refute the arguments set out above
as reasons for denying recovery. It seems best, then, to discuss
the refutation of these arguments in the same order in which
they appear in the first part of this note.
A. Child in the Womb as a Person in Esse
Those courts allowing recovery for prenatal injuries condemn
the theory that until born the child is merely "a part of the
mother." In Kine v. Zukerman2i plaintiff's mother, who was in
her seventh month of pregnancy, was injured as the result of
defendant's negligence. Plaintiff was born about a month and a
half later, and bore injuries which he alleged were caused by the
defendant's negligent injury to plaintiff's mother. In allowing
plaintiff a cause of action a Pennsylvania court declared:
.. at early common law an injury to an unborn child was
looked upon as an injury to the mother exclusively. The
child and the mother were one until delivery,... the former
was not yet a human being.... It was not long, however,
before the basic narrowness and inequity of this view was
recognized.2 2
And in Scott v. McPheeters,23 where plaintiff sued for defen-
dant's alleged negligence in the use of clamps as incident to the
delivery of plaintiff at childbirth, a California Appellate court
stated:
A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an
existing person, so far as may be necessary for its interests
in the event of its subsequent birth.2 4
Obviously both these courts were making reference to the propo-
sition that in the law of wills an unborn child may take a devise
or bequest, i.e., that he is there considered a legal person from
the moment of conception. These courts feel that since the un-
born person may take property by descent or devise, certainly
he should be entitled to compensation for injuries wrongfully
inflicted upon him by the negligent act of another. This reason-
ing seems sound.
There seems to be another legal analogy which supports the
argument that the unborn child is, or should be considered an in-
dependent legal person. As was mentioned, if a person feloni-
21. 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924).
22. Kine v. Zukerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924).
23. 33 Cal. App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).
24. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App.2d 629, 630, 92 P.2d 678, 679 (1939).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss3/7
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ously wounds a pregnant woman, and her child is born but dies
thereafter as a result of such injuries, the defendant is guilty
of murder.25 Analogizing, it would seem that where the criminal
law acknowledges the independent existence of the unborn, so
also should the law of torts. As was stated by Lamont, J., in Mon-
treal Tramways v. Leveille:26
While in some cases there may be no analogy, yet there
are, in my opinion, many cases in which crime and tort are
merely different aspects of the same set of facts and in
which there is so close an analogy that something more than
the bare denial of it is necessary to carry conviction. The
wrongful act which constitutes a crime may constitute also
a tort, and, if the law recognizes the separate existence of
the unborn child sufficiently to punish the crime, it is diffi-
cult to see why it should not also recognize its separate exis-
tence for the purpose of redressing the tort.27
Perhaps the most convincing agrument voiced in favor of the
rule regarding an unborn child as a person in esse was that
expounded by Chief Justice Brogan, of the Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey, in his dissenting opinion in Stemmer
v. Kline :28
While it is a fact that there is a close dependence by the
unborn child on the organism of the mother, it is not dis-
puted today that the mother and the child are two separate
and distinct entities; that the unborn child has his own
system of circulation of the blood separate and apart from
the mother; that there is no communication between the
two circulation systems; that the heart beat of the child
is not in tune with that of the mother but is more rapid; that
there is no dependence by the child on the mother except
for sustenance... 29
It will be noticed that the cases quoted above did not discuss
the question as to whether any restrictions should be placed
upon the rule that the unborn child should be considered a
person in esse. There are, however, some courts which impose
a restriction based on the stage of development of the unborn
child, upon the child's right of action. These courts hold that in
25. See note 2 supra.
26. Can. S.C. 456, 4 D.L.R. 337, 344 (Canada 1933).
27. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, Can. S.C. 456, 4 D.L.R. 337 (Canada
1933).
28. 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942).
29. Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 459, 466, 26 A.2d 684, 687 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1942) (dissenting opinion).
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order to maintain the action, the plaintiff must have been a
"viable foetus" when the injury occurred. The definition offered
by the courts of "viable" is that stage of prenatal development
at which the child could survive if artificially separated from its
mother. All foetuses do not become viable at the same relative
time. In one case a child was born alive 144 days after its
conception in the womb of its mother.30 Of course this case
is an exceptional one. In general it is believed that the earliest
state of development at which the child becomes viable is at the
beginning of the sixth month.
In Cooper v. Blanck3' plaintiff sued her landlord for injuries
received by herself and for physical and mental suffering en-
dured by her child. Plaintiff was lying on her bed when the
plaster from the defendant's ceiling fell on her abdomen. At
that time plaintiff was in her eighth month of pregnancy. She
alleged that as a result of the injury her child was born prema-
turely, suffered physical and mental pain, and died shortly there-
after. Among other things the Louisiana Court of Appeals dis-
cussed the viability theory, and concluded:
While the earliest period at which a foetus may be said
to be viable is still a matter of considerable doubt, .. ., the
fact that the foetus [here] is in an advanced stage of
pregnancy, viable and in fact possessed of prenatal life,
is indisputable.2
The court went on to point out that a child has a cause of action
for injuries received when he was a viable foetus.
The courts which allow recovery in these prenatal injury
cases, and those which support the theory that a viable child
should be considered an independent person often quote Justice
Boggs' dissenting opinion in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital:33
A foetus in the womb of the mother may well be regarded
as but a part of the bowels of the mother during a portion
of the period of gestation; but if, while in the womb, it
reaches that prenatal stage of viability when the destruction
of the life of the mother does not necessarily end its ex-
istence also, and when, if separated prematurely, and by
artificial means from the mother, it would be so far a ma-
tured human being so that it would live and grow, mentally
3'0. 3 WHARTON & STILLES MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 36 (4th ed. 1884).
31. 39 So.2d 352 (La. App. 1923) (Not reported until 1949).
32. Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352, 355 (La. App. 1923) (Not reported
until 1949).
33. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss3/7
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and physically as other children generally, it is but to deny a
palpable fact to argue there is but one life,... the life of
the mother.3 4
If it is felt that the concept of "legal personality" is essential,
the distinction between viability and non-viability is probably an
important, if not controlling, element in the determination of
whether plaintiff was a legal person.
Surely, however, the problem goes deeper than that. The con-
cept utilized by the courts, ie., that one must be a legal person
at the time of injury, does not seem either necessary nor properly
descriptive of all factors of policy which form the real basis of
decision in cases of this type. It appears abundantly clear that
the defendant has engaged in conduct which is legally blame-
worthy and that the plaintiff, as a result of such conductP5 has
suffered certain injuries. Such a problem is not solved by adroit
statements that plaintiff was or was not a legal person. Such a
statement is nothing more than a verbalization of an otherwise
reached conclusion, i.e., that plaintiff may not recover from de-
fendant. The problem is rather whether this consequence of de-
fendant's conduct is outside the scope of the risk or, stated differ-
ently, whether this interest of the plaintiff is protected against
this hazard. 36 That in turn involves a weighing of factors, the
making of an important value decision. The defendant's interest
in freedom of activity should, on the one hand, be restricted to the
least degree necessary. In this situation the more consequences
for which the defendant will be held liable, the more restricted
will be his freedom of activity. Conversely, the interest of the
plaintiff in the integrity of his person is one of the most Impor-
tant interests given protection in tort law.
Many factors go into the weighing process. Convenience of
judicial administration, ability to distribute losses through in-
surance or increased prices or rates are two. Another is what
Judge Andrews describes as a "rough sense of justice." 37 Here
it would appear that the relative wrongfulness of the defen-
34. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 370, 56 N.E. 638, 641(1900).
35. Ability to prove a causal relationship is assumed for the purpose
of this analysis. That the assumption is unwarranted for other purposes
is demonstrated infTa.
36. See GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927).
37. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N. E. 99,(1928) (dissenting opinion).
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dant's conduct become important. There is abundant analysis
tending to support this view when there is a "difference in kind"
in the conduct of the defendant. Thus it has been deduced that
certain interests are given legal protection only against inten-
tional misconduct, e.g., the interest in freedom from emotional
disturbance. Then too the conclusion has been reached that the
defendant is responsible for more consequences in an intentional
tort situation than in one where he has only been negligent, and
for more where he has been negligent than where the conse-
quences result from his engaging in an ultrahazardous activity.
The theory is that the gradation is based on the relative fault
involved.Y It seems likely that the same idea holds true to a
greater or less extent in different kinds of negligence situations.
Holmes has pointed out that fault connoted the idea of choice,
and there is no choice when we do not know (either objectively
or subjectively) the likely consequences of the conduct in which
we engage.39 The idea, of course, is often expressed in terms of
"risk." Since liability for consequences is related at least roughly
to some concept of perceived or "ought to be perceived," risk,'4
and since perception of risk is an essential element in choice and
since choice determines relative wrongfulness, it seems fair to
say that relative fault on the part of defendant is not unimpor-
tant in determining liability for particular consequences.
Presumably in these cases there is a perceived risk of injury to
the mother, a person, so that it cannot be said that the risk
against which the usefulness of defendant's conduct is to be
weighed is not violation of someone's personal integrity. It is
true, however, that the risk is greater where there is likelihood
of injury to 100 persons than it is where there is a risk of injury
to only one person. We seem now to have arrived at the crux of
the question. It seems not unreasonable to say that a defendant
should be expected to realize that any woman may be pregnant
and that that factor must be considered part of his choice. If
then, the factors, other than relative wrongfulness, are not of
sufficient importance to be controlling in the particular case, we
may conclude that the risk of injury to a foetus is one which
38. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 457 (1941).
39. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 94 (1881).
40. The phrase "perceived risk" should be understood to convey the
meaning that the risk either was subjectively perceived or ought to have
been perceived in an objective sense.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss3/7
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should be borne by a defendant who is negligent with respect to
a woman in such a way as to subject her interest in her personal
integrity to an unreasonable risk of harm.41
B. Duty Owed to the Unborn Child
Once the courts recognize that the unborn child is to be con-
sidered a legal person, there naturally follows the holding that a
defendant owes the unborn child a duty to use reasonable care
to refrain from injuring him. Thus, in Verkennes v. Corniea,42
where plaintiff sued for his decedent's prenatal injuries and
subsequent death under a wrongful death statute, the Minnesota
Supreme Court allowed recovery, considering plaintiff's decedent
a "person" at the time of the injury, hence owed a duty by
defendant.
C.43 Others Reasons: Probability of Fictitious Claims;
Lack of Precedent; Mother Can Recover for Injuries
Not Too Remote; Court's Refusal to Legislate
These last four arguments offered by those courts which deny
a cause of action for prenatal injuries are seemingly without
merit, and have been ably refuted by those courts allowing
recovery.
First, there is the argument that allowance of recovery will
induce fictitious and unwarranted claims. A Pennsylvania court
has answered:
Shall we close the door of justice in the face of a deserving
litigant merely because of the fear that the underserving
might at times receive more than their due? We think not.44
Certainly this line of reasoning seems sound. It can be fairly
stated that here are inherent dangers of fictitious claims in a
great number of lawsuits. But this aspect of the problem is to
be regarded as one of proof not of right. Correct rules of pro-
cedure and enforcement of the rules of evidence will negative the
infiltration into the courts of fictitious plaintiffs.
41. See note 63 HAll. L. REV. 671 (1950).
42. 229 Minn. 280, 38 N.E.2d 838 (1949).
43. Since there is much controversy as to whether a plaintiff can show
that an injury to his mother caused a prenatal injury to the plaintiff, and
since this seems to be the only argument against allowance of a cause
of action which causes any real difficulty, it seems best to dispose of other
arguments offered against allowance of recovery and discuss the causation
problem last.
44. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227, 229 (1924).
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Second, there is the argument that there is lack of precedent
favoring recovery, and that the courts should respect the doc-
trine of stare decisis. This reasoning is also fallacious. As has
been said, ".... an adjudicated case is not indispensable to estab-
lish a right to recover under the rules of the common law."45
Early in the development of the common law a right of action in
a person negligently injured by another was recognized. This
was the "doctrine of law" out of which innumerable causes of
action arose. A few decades ago an unborn child was regarded
as merely a part of its mother. However, as civilization pro-
gressed and became more complex, as new discoveries were made
in science and medicine, the unborn child en ventre sa mere came
to be looked upon as a person, not as a mass of flesh attached to,
and a part of, its mother. The great merit of the common law
is its flexibility, its adaptability to changing social conditions.
While the unborn child was formerly considered a part of its
mother, it is now recognized as a person, hence entitled to a
cause of action under the age-old doctrine permitting compensa-
tion for injuries negligently inflicted.
The next argument offered opposing recovery for prenatal
injuries is that the mother can recover for injuries to the child
which are not too remote for any recovery. No court has directly
answered this proposition, probably because it is vague and
because it is refuted when a duty to the viable foetus is found.
But this answer may be given: the child is a person; he, in
addition to his mother, was injured; certainly she has a cause
of action; but there were two persons, not one; two causes of
action arose, not one.
Finally, it has been argued that it is the province of legislation,
not judicial decision, to give the cause of action for prenatal
injuries. Of course this proposition arose from the court's view
that the child is not a "person," hence not entitled to a cause of
action under constitutions or statutes conferring such a right
only upon persons. Since that proposition seems to have been
rebutted, the courts need not regard a recovery as "judicial
legislation."
45. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640
(1900).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss3/7
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D. Proof of Causation Between the
Injury to the Mother and the Resultant Injury
to the Unborn Child
It seems fair to state at this point that all the other arguments
voiced against allowance of a cause of action for prenatal in-
juries are not persuasive. There remains only the causation
problem.
The courts which allow recovery find little difficulty in saying
that causation can be shown by expert medical testimony, and
that the question as to whether the defendant's negligent con-
duct caused the injury to the child is for the jury.4 Prosser sup-
ports this view by saying:
it seems clear that adequate safeguards could be estab-
lished by requiring sufficient proof by competent medical
evidence, which is possible at least in many cases.47
If the case is one in which there is a reasonable probability
that the injury to the mother did in fact cause the injury or
deformity in the child, then this question of causation would
properly be submitted to the jury, since it is never incumbent on
the plaintiff to rule out all possibility that the defendant's con-
duct was not a cause. However, if the case is one in which even
expert medical testimony can only be based on conjecture, and
where a causal relation between the accident and the injury to
the child cannot be established to any degree of certainty, then
the case should never be submitted to the jury. Discussion with
obstetricians reveals that such is the present state of medical
knowledge.
In order to discuss the problems incident to the establishment
of causation, it seems best to divide the cases factually into the
following categories:
1. Malpractice cases
2. Cases involving traumatic injury
(a) Cases in which there is a direct physical injury to
the womb and foetus.
(b) Cases in which, immediately following a traumatic
injury, plaintiff is born prematurely.
46. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939);
Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 834(1949).
47. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 189, 190 (1941).
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(c) Cases in which there is trauma to the mother, but
where the plaintiff is not born until the completion
of normal gestation.
1. Malpractice cases
There are a number of recognized causes of congenital mal-
formations and deformities for which the obstetrician or attend-
ing physician might well be held responsible. For instance, it
has been established that food deficiencies during pregnancy
might cause various anomalies in the child.48 A defective diet
prescribed by a doctor who disregards the nutritional needs of
the mother and child might be successfully shown to be the cause
of a deformity or malformation prenatally developed.
It has also been shown that where short wave irradiation
treatments are used on the pregnant woman, congenital mal-
formations may develop in the unborn child.4 9 This may occur
when either X-ray or radium treatments are administered. Low
voltage treatments will not have any evil effects, but "deep ther-
48. BLEYER, ADR1EN, M.D., "Congenital Malformations" (Lecture de-
livered to seniors in the School of Medicine, Washington University, St.
Louis, Mo., on Oct. 24, 1949, and on May 10, 1950). Dr. Bleyer points out
that a deficiency of iodin may cause blindness in the child, or even
a stillbirth. So also, deficiencies of certain vitamins during pregnancy
may cause congenital malformations, e.g., blindness. He goes on to sum-
marize the findings of Dr. Douglas P. Murphy of the Department of
Obstetrics of the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Murphy's article, "Food
Habits of Mothers of Congenitally Malformed Children" reveals that:
1. 35% of the mothers of malformed children took no milk during
pregnancy.
2. About 81% of these mothers had less than two servings daily of
leafy vegetables.
3. 69% went through pregnancy without citrus fruits.
4. Only 17% used whole grain bread.
5. Anemia was observed with unusual frequency among women giving
birth to defective children.
Dr. Bleyer cites other reports indicating that women maintaining defective
diets miscarried about three times as often as women with sensible diets.
The diet deficiency aspect of Dr. Bleyer's lecture concludes:
The thing that comes out of all of this is, that we must begin to think
of the fetus as a separate being, quite independent of the mother and
having his own nutritional requirements; we must remember that
the fetus is made, not from the mother's body, but from what she
eats, and that, although the hostess, she is not the larder. Hence-
forth we must think of the dietary of the unborn much as we have
been thinking of the dietary of infancy. Nor is there any doubt that
pediatric interest, although not so practical, starts with conception
rather than with the birth of the child.
49. BLEYuR, ADRWEN, M.D., "Congenital Malformations" (Lecture de-
livered to seniors in the School of Medicine, Washington University, St.
Louis, Mo., on Oct. 24, 1949, and on May 10, 1950); Dunlap, Charles E.,
Effects of Radiation in PATHOLoGY 175, 191 (Anderson ed. 1948).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss3/7
422 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
apy" (i.e., treatments of greater intensity) may cause anomalies
in the unborn child. If, for instance, a doctor incorrectly diag-
nosed an actual pregnancy as a tumor of the womb, and further,
if it could be shown that his incorrect diagnosis was the result
of actionable negligence, it might fairly be inferred that X-ray
treatments administered on the person of the plaintiff's mother
caused the plaintiff's resultant deformities. One such case is
Stemmer v. Kline." There the jury found the defendent physi-
cian negligent in failing to discover that plaintiff's mother was
pregnant. Defendent administered deep therapy X-ray treat-
ments. Plaintiff was born so defective that he was incapable of
speech, sight and hearing. On appeal the judgment for the plain-
tiff was reversed, the court holding that plaintiff had no cause
of action for prenatal injuries. From what has been said here,
the result seems erroneous. However, it must be remembered
that plaintiff was denied recovery for reasons other than the
court's belief that sufficient proof of causation was not made.
It would seem that in at least the two discussed instances
sufficient proof of causation between doctor's negligence and the
malformation of the plaintiff might be established. However,
the answer is not quite that simple. It has been shown that there
are other recognized causes of congenital malformations, such as
Rubella (i.e., German measles) and Diabetes in early pregnancy;
syphilis, aging of the mother, and heredity also play an impor-
tant role in causing congenital malformations.1 In addition to
these, the records are replete with cases of deformities where
there is no known cause and where the pregnancy has been a
normal one from all appearances.
It seems obvious, then, that in the malpractice cases, the
courts should be very skeptical of expert medical testimony in
determining whether to permit the jury to find causal relation.
Even where it is shown positively that the defendant doctor has
breached the duty to his patient, this by no means proves that
his particular negligent act caused a particular malady; there
may have been other known causes; there may have been un-
known causes. Yet there seems to be a sufficient basis for per-
mitting a doctor to give expert testimony relating to causation
under these circumstances. It cannot be urged too strongly,
50. 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (Ct. Err. App. 1942).
51. See note 49 supra.
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however, that the trial judge should ride with a tight rein here.
He should insist on a showing that there is no history of any of
the other known causes, i.e., Rubella, diabetes in early preg-
nancy, syphilis, etc. When the absence of other possible known
causes is affirmatively shown, then the fact that unknown causes
may be in operation should not preclude the judge from permit-
ting the jury to find a causal connection.
2. Cases Involving Traumatic Injury
(a) Trauma To The Womb and To The Foetus
Where there is direct injury to the uterus by penetration
thereof, and the penetrating object is alleged to have come into
contact with the foetus, there should be recovery only where
some part of that object is found imbedded in the child when the
child is born at term, or at least born alive. While this rule may
seem extremely rigid when applied in certain situations it is
clear that the present state of medical knowledge will not per-
mit a more lenient one to be applied. Suppose, for example, that
a pregnant woman is involved in an automobile accident occa-
sioned by defendant's negligence; that her abdomen is pierced
by a long and sharp piece of glass; that at term the child is born
with scars, or even with an amputation. In such a situation
while it is possible that the penetration by the sliver of glass
caused the amputation or scar, there are so many cases where
precisely that condition is found even though there was no
trauma history of any kind,5 2 that it cannot be said with any
reasonable probability that the scar or amputation resulted from
the penetration by the sliver of glass. Any doctor who testifies
that in his opinion it did, is simply guessing. If, however, a piece
of glass is found imbedded in the child, quite a different situation
is presented. There the probabilities are all in favor of the exis-
tence of a causal connection.
(b) Trauma To the Mother Followed By Immediate Pre-
mature Birth of Plaintiff
Where there is severe trauma to the mother, followed by imme-
diate and premature birth of the plaintiff, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the accident, caused by defendant's negligence, has
52. Birnbaum, Dr. R., A CLINICAL MANUAL OF THE MALFORMATIONS AND
CONGENITAL DIsEAsEs OF THE FoETus 13 (1912).
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"forced nature's hand," and caused the plaintiff's entrance into
the world at a date earlier than that appointed. In such case,
where there is no other explanation of the premature birth, and
the early arrival of plaintiff has caused him to be weak or
anemic, causation has been sufficiently proven. In Williams v.
Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.,"' plaintiff's mother fell when defen-
dant's servant negligently started the carrier on which she was
riding. At that time plaintiff was a foetus en ventre sa mere of
seven months. Plaintiff's mother began labor immediately, and
plaintiff was born two months before term. She (plaintiff) al-
leged that as a result of her premature birth, caused by defen-
dant's negligence, she was suffering from heart trouble, anemia,
inability to walk, and Jacksonian Epilepsy. At the trial level
defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's petition was sustained. On
appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court the case was reversed, the
court saying that the child has a cause of action for prenatal
injuries, and that sufficient proof of causation had been adduced
at the trial.
(c) There remains for discussion the factual situation in
which the pregnant woman is injured, completes her normal
term and delivers a child which is malformed or defective in one
or more respects. Perhaps because of a general assumption on
the part of medical authorities that causation could not be dem-
onstrated, remarkably little medical research has been under-
taken for the purpose of demonstrating the presence or absence
of such causal relationship.
One medicolegal article has related an interesting case in-
volving trauma during early pregnancy.54 The patient was a
woman in her third month of pregnancy. She was found uncon-
scious on the street, and was taken to the hospital. X-rays
showed:
1. Fracture of the right acromial process (i.e., the outward
extension of the spine of the scapula, forming the point
of the [right] shoulder2s
2. Fracture of the pelvis.
3. Fracture of the sacrum, with no displacement.
53. 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
54. Meyer, Harry, M.D., and Cummins, Charles, M.D., Severe Maternal
Trauma In Early Pregnancy; Congenital Amputations in the Infant at
Term, 42 Am. Joun. OBSTEIRnCS AND GYNEcoLOGY 150, 153 (1941).
55. DORLAND, 2 Am. ILLUSTATE MEDICAL DICTmIONARY 47 (1948).
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4. Compound comminuted fractures of the lower halves of
the right tibia and fibula, with overriding.
5. Fracture of the right parietal (from which patient com-
plained of persistent headache and diplopia).
The patient could remember nothing of what happened to her,
but the obvious conclusion is that she was struck (evidently with
great force, considering the injuries) by a hit-and-run driver.
At the close of the normal period of gestation the patient deliv-
ered a 6 pound boy. The child had several congenital amputa-
tions, i.e., a deep cleft in the upper arm, completed amputations
of parts of the fingers of the left hand, and a partial amputation
of the right foot.
A thorough examination was made of the mother as to any
other illnesses or abnormalities during her pregnancy; none were
discovered. Further, the records showed she had completed a
normal pregnancy previous to the one in question, and delivered
a normal child.
To the ordinary layman all the evidence in this case seems to
indicate that the deformities present in the child were probably
caused by the accident. However, the authors point out:
A causal relationship between the maternal injury and thefetal defects cannot be established, but since the possibility
is not absolutely excluded, the potential medico-legal aspects
of this and similar cases are deserving of note. [Italics
added] .51
Thus the authors of the article quoted affirm the views of the vast
majority of obstetricians and gynecologists. In spite of the fact
that the only known abnormal circumstance which occurred
during the pregnancy of the mother was the traumatic injury,
the authors declare:
From consideration of other reported instances of congenital
amputations in human subjects and of the parallel condi-
tions observed in mice and rats, we conclude that the am-
putations in the present case are to be explained as the
result of incapacity which was inherent in the developing
embryo.57
This opinion seems to indicate that an allegation that trauma is
the cause of a prenatal injury to a child born at term is without
merit, and the question as to its truth or falsity should not be
56. Meyer, supra note 54, at 150.
57. Meyer, supra note 54, at 153.
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submitted to the jury. As was said, the possibility of causation
has not been wholly ruled out. But a plaintiff should not be
allowed to take his case to the jury on a mere scintilla of evi-
dence. Such is the case here. Where there is trauma during
pregnancy and the child is born at the end of term bearing some
defect or abnormality, such anomaly is presumptively the result
of some other known cause, or unknown cause. There is no med-
ical information showing positively that mechanical trauma has
any effect on a foetus, a quite different situation from that where
deep therapy X-ray treatments or improper diet is involved. In
such case, therefore, no cause of action should accrue.
CONCLUSION
We may fairly conclude that neither archaic notions of legal
identity nor most of the other stated reasons for denying recov-
ery are satisfactory determinants for the solution of this prob-
lem. Nevertheless, it appears that the vast majority of cases
have reached a correct result, and that courts should proceed
with extreme caution in the direction of varying the existing
law. Above all, they should be kept constantly aware of the then
state of medical knowledge with regard to the connection
between trauma and injury to a foetus. In most of the situations
considered, medical knowledge refutes the existence of any
causal connection, hence that issue should not be submitted to
the jury.
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